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Bibliographic Data: Jansen, Marius B. Sakamoto Ryôma and the Meiji Restoration. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
Main Argument: "Within Japan the Meiji Restoration leaders also served as examples of a new and ideal type in politics: that of the idealistic, individualistic, and courageous patriot who gave his all for the imperial cause--the shishi. …the idealism, dedication, and courage of the shishi was usually combined with a practicality and desire for self-attainment that made for something of a pattern of response to the challenge that was brought by the West" (x-xi).
Historiographical Engagement: E.H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State
Useful points
# That said, "bakufu policies determined the political alternatives available to the great lords and court nobles" to a large extent (ibid)
# The shishi were young, idealistic, romantic, classist jerks, by and large, often fatally naive, at least initially; by the mid-1860s, however, "they had a new understanding of the complexity of the problems their country faced. They begin to emerge from their papers and letters as confident and dedicated men, tempered by danger. They had shown and seen enough courage to take it for granted, and they were now concerned with other qualities--generosity, foresight, prudence" (205)
# NB: class division within the samurai legal status--lords and upper level retainers whose positions were not threatened by economic problems tended to remain conservative, partly because reform was associated with lower, poorer samurai; and vice versa
# By 1867 things had changed drastically--despite the ability of the new shogun, his position was shown to be very weak, and the loyalists now planned to overthrow the bakufu by force. Moreover, "the day for intrigue and secrecy was giving way to one of formal alliances and high-level discussions. The free-wheeling rônin were no longer as necessary to the alliances formed, for self-interest among the domains provided all the spur that was needed" (311). Unsurprisingly, many of them including Ryôma sought a rapprochement with their home fiefs as part of this turn, and in Ryôma's case and others, succeeded.
# Jansen argues that "Sakamoto's ideas about the government that was to follow the shogun's resignation deserve careful study, for they provide the link between the vague doubts about feudalism of his early years and the dramatic reforms of the early Meiji period in which he did not live to take part" (312).
Conclusion: Argument, Sources, Examples Jansen argues again that "the outstanding intellectual and political experience in the formative years of the Restoration activists was the discovery that their society was incapable of successful resistance to the Western threat" (347). We confront again the question of class interest, which Jansen does not see in Tosa; for him the division is between loyalists and reformers among the samurai status group, which to some extent is also an urban/rural divide. Jansen also argues that "the individual purpose and daring of the late Tokugawa shishi tended, in the overwhelming majority of cases, to be set in an atmosphere of broad agreement on goals, though not on methods" (377), which he attributes to the vitality of Tokugawa values even as he notes that the shishi tradition was open to being appropriated by others ranging from Sun Yat-sen to the assassins of 1930s Japan; "the self-confidence, conviction, and arrogance that made the shishi such formidable antagonists were something new. … Self-motivated, they established a tradition of dissent and personal intervention that survived to become one of the most dynamic aspects in modern Japanese politics" (376).
Critical assessment: It's trippy to read a book written before the Economic Miracle. That said, I don't think Jansen is wrong about the Restoration or Ryôma's role in it, though his overarching arguments do smack somewhat of impact-response theory in a way that I would want to investigate further. I do think he totally ignores some aspects of what was going on, such as the domestic context and the ee ja nai ka flash mobs. (I just really like the flash mobs, okay?)
Further reading: Beasley, The Meiji Restoration
Meta notes: "海の向こうに、世界が広がっている。"
Main Argument: "Within Japan the Meiji Restoration leaders also served as examples of a new and ideal type in politics: that of the idealistic, individualistic, and courageous patriot who gave his all for the imperial cause--the shishi. …the idealism, dedication, and courage of the shishi was usually combined with a practicality and desire for self-attainment that made for something of a pattern of response to the challenge that was brought by the West" (x-xi).
Historiographical Engagement: E.H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State
Useful points
The Tosa scene, in turn, was one variant of a national picture in which bakufu policies, internal bureaucratic rivalries, and social and economic tensions made for contrasting and contradictory policies followed by the great fiefs. The han authorities alternately utilized and repressed the activities of their subordinates according to the way in which they read the signs of the times. In many respects the years after 1860 were remarkable for the degree to which samurai from different fiefs worked together, often in continuation of patterns of conspiracy that had begun in the Edo fencing academies. A comparable sense of common interest and danger produced cooperation between a number of great lords who saw in the slogan kôbu gattai, reconciliation of court and camp, an opportunity to improve their own positions relative to those of the bakufu and its other vassals. Not that national interests were beginning to predominate for the daimyo; the regional advantage might be interpreted in various ways, but it was never ignored. After 1860 all groups looked for allies and claimed the support of tradition, with the result that the court nobles were drawn into the political picture once again. The loyalist years were remarkable for the boldness with which some of the Kyoto aristocrats turned to national politics. (94)
# That said, "bakufu policies determined the political alternatives available to the great lords and court nobles" to a large extent (ibid)
# The shishi were young, idealistic, romantic, classist jerks, by and large, often fatally naive, at least initially; by the mid-1860s, however, "they had a new understanding of the complexity of the problems their country faced. They begin to emerge from their papers and letters as confident and dedicated men, tempered by danger. They had shown and seen enough courage to take it for granted, and they were now concerned with other qualities--generosity, foresight, prudence" (205)
# NB: class division within the samurai legal status--lords and upper level retainers whose positions were not threatened by economic problems tended to remain conservative, partly because reform was associated with lower, poorer samurai; and vice versa
# By 1867 things had changed drastically--despite the ability of the new shogun, his position was shown to be very weak, and the loyalists now planned to overthrow the bakufu by force. Moreover, "the day for intrigue and secrecy was giving way to one of formal alliances and high-level discussions. The free-wheeling rônin were no longer as necessary to the alliances formed, for self-interest among the domains provided all the spur that was needed" (311). Unsurprisingly, many of them including Ryôma sought a rapprochement with their home fiefs as part of this turn, and in Ryôma's case and others, succeeded.
# Jansen argues that "Sakamoto's ideas about the government that was to follow the shogun's resignation deserve careful study, for they provide the link between the vague doubts about feudalism of his early years and the dramatic reforms of the early Meiji period in which he did not live to take part" (312).
Conclusion: Argument, Sources, Examples Jansen argues again that "the outstanding intellectual and political experience in the formative years of the Restoration activists was the discovery that their society was incapable of successful resistance to the Western threat" (347). We confront again the question of class interest, which Jansen does not see in Tosa; for him the division is between loyalists and reformers among the samurai status group, which to some extent is also an urban/rural divide. Jansen also argues that "the individual purpose and daring of the late Tokugawa shishi tended, in the overwhelming majority of cases, to be set in an atmosphere of broad agreement on goals, though not on methods" (377), which he attributes to the vitality of Tokugawa values even as he notes that the shishi tradition was open to being appropriated by others ranging from Sun Yat-sen to the assassins of 1930s Japan; "the self-confidence, conviction, and arrogance that made the shishi such formidable antagonists were something new. … Self-motivated, they established a tradition of dissent and personal intervention that survived to become one of the most dynamic aspects in modern Japanese politics" (376).
Critical assessment: It's trippy to read a book written before the Economic Miracle. That said, I don't think Jansen is wrong about the Restoration or Ryôma's role in it, though his overarching arguments do smack somewhat of impact-response theory in a way that I would want to investigate further. I do think he totally ignores some aspects of what was going on, such as the domestic context and the ee ja nai ka flash mobs. (I just really like the flash mobs, okay?)
Further reading: Beasley, The Meiji Restoration
Meta notes: "海の向こうに、世界が広がっている。"
