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ahorbinskiBibliographic Data: Segal, Ethan Isaac. Coins, Trade, and the State: Economic Growth in Early Medieval Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Main Argument: Segal looks at the economic history of early medieval Japan and argues that diffuse political authority in this period enabled three significant changes: one, that the country began to shift definitively from commodity money to metal currency; two, that this initial shift took place in defiance of government control; and three, that "the sweeping changes of this period allowed provincial figures greater economic agency than they experienced in earlier times" (3).
Historiographical Engagement: Delmer Brown, whom Segal disagrees with (Brown saw an unbreakable linkage between political stability and economic growth); Tom Smith and others who believe that monetization did not really pick up until the Edo period (incorrect); Toyoda and Sugiyama, who saw economic growth as a byproduct of political fragmentation
Introduction: Argument, Sources, Examples Segal argues that during Japan's medieval age, "center and periphery worked together to create a more market-centered economy" (7). Moreover, "particularly from the late 13thC onward, their use of money and involvement in expanding trade led to broad social changes and the beginnings of economic growth" (ibid). Agreeing with Kristina Troost and Suzanne Gay, Segal argues that "economic growth was not simply the result of political instability. It also contributed to it" (16), as provincials flexing growing economic muscles disrupted old center/periphery relationships. Thus, "money and trade played key roles in the transformation from a classical society to an early modern one" (22).
Chapter 1: Argument, Sources, Examples Segal reviews the history of coinage in the archipelago, which predates the introduction of writing. It seems that by the 10thC the coinage was in a spiral of debasement brought on by inadequate copper supplies, with the result that Gresham's Law (bad money drives out good) seems to have been given free play, to the point that the economy appears to have been essentially demonetized by the 11thC. Beginning in the 12thC, however, imported Chinese cash came to play a central role in the economy, much to the displeasure of the aristocracy. Segal concludes that the importation of Chinese coins "represented a new trend in the Japan-China trade" and that these coins circulated in defiance of official opposition to them and official attempts to enforce fiduciary rather than actual values (64). Finally, "coins played a key role in the creation of the new medieval economy by facilitating exchange between elites and non-elites outside of the confines of government taxation and the shôen system" (65).
Chapter 2: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at the development of markets; "after the official market system collapsed in the Heian period, urban elites turned to private tribute for the distribution of goods while everyone else relied on merchants, trade, and local markets," which became an important nexus for cash in the countryside (68). Segal concludes that "money and markets became commonplace as much due to the actions of middle-level figures such as estate managers, provincial warriors, and traveling merchants as they did to elites such as bakufu officials and estate proprietors" (ibid).
Chapter 3: Argument, Sources, Examples In this chapter, Segal re-evaluates the tokuseirei decree of 1297, in which the bakufu alienated its retainers' (gokenin) debts, disastrously. Segal argues that "the widespread involvement of gokenin in the evolving, impersonal, market-based economy threatened the bakufu's ability to demand service from its retainers" (110). He concludes that this decree and similar legislation from the period was "a conflation of vice, virtue, and self-interest" (146). Gokenin "vice" led to a bakufu solution that invoked the political idiom of "virtuous" rule but which was motivated by self-interest, namely "the bakufu's interest in perpetuation lord-retainer relations and ensuring that warriors rendered service" (147).
Chapter 4: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at the breakdown of the shôen system in the 14thC, which was part of the transformation of center/periphery relations in this period. Segal charts two major changes to the nengu payment system in this period: one, a shift to commutation, in which rents were paid in cash rather than in kind (often, but not always, at the behest of cultivators rather than proprietors); and two, "the widespread employment of a money remittance system--'bills of exchange'--by merchants and estate managers to forward cash over long distances" (150). Both of these were spurred by the development of regional exchange networks not mediated by the center or elites, which "created demand for estate goods outside of the capital, and thereby made it possible for managers and peasants to sell goods for cash" (166). Ultimately, the uptake of widespread changes in the economy "speaks volumes about how creatively merchants and provincial estate managers could circumvent the problems of divided central government in the 15thC" (183).
Chapter 5: Argument, Sources, Examples After the Kamakura period central elites began to participate more directly in the commercial economy (much to their frequent dismay). The Ashikaga probably took the most active role in attempting to exert their control over the economy, but their efforts were much less than fully successful for several reasons, not least of which because they were politically divided and because they had no guaranteed revenue streams; they could not even monopolize trade with China or the importation of cash effectively. Non-elites continued to play a central role (had) in the development of the late medieval economy. Moreover, medieval money continued to circulate for much of the first Tokugawa century, having laid the groundwork for the increased monetization and commercialization of the Tokugawa economy.
Conclusion: Argument, Sources, Examples Segal concludes by arguing for a late 13thC increase in the spread of money and markets by pointing to the fact that money and markets began to appear in the early to mid 12thC. Monetization "accompanied noteworthy changes in the relationship between center and periphery" and also caused them, as well as "changes in the ways that people thought about the world" (219).
Critical assessment: Ethan Segal is no Wally Scheidel, I have to say. He does not actually know enough about money to say some of the things he is saying--for example, he blithely declares that "even when the government attempted to declare some coins to be worth more than others, people appear to have used coins as if they were of uniform value" (59). Only if you take "uniform value" to mean that "bad money had driven out the good in accordance with Gresham's Law, and general debasement meant that most money was not worth much, despite what the court declared" does this sentence make sense. You could also say something like "the Japanese court attempted to enforce a fiduciary currency but was unable to do so, since people tended to use money at its intrinsic value." He also doesn't appear to understand that taxes and rents are not the same thing.
That having been said, although Segal's analysis is often not very sophisticated, I think his conclusions are fundamentally correct. I also think that there is a better book out there waiting to be written on Japanese currency and monetization than this one.
Further reading: William Wayne Farris, Japan's Medieval Population; Janet Goodwin, Alms and Vagabonds
Meta notes: It might be useful to understand how money works before writing a book about it, IJS.
Main Argument: Segal looks at the economic history of early medieval Japan and argues that diffuse political authority in this period enabled three significant changes: one, that the country began to shift definitively from commodity money to metal currency; two, that this initial shift took place in defiance of government control; and three, that "the sweeping changes of this period allowed provincial figures greater economic agency than they experienced in earlier times" (3).
Historiographical Engagement: Delmer Brown, whom Segal disagrees with (Brown saw an unbreakable linkage between political stability and economic growth); Tom Smith and others who believe that monetization did not really pick up until the Edo period (incorrect); Toyoda and Sugiyama, who saw economic growth as a byproduct of political fragmentation
Introduction: Argument, Sources, Examples Segal argues that during Japan's medieval age, "center and periphery worked together to create a more market-centered economy" (7). Moreover, "particularly from the late 13thC onward, their use of money and involvement in expanding trade led to broad social changes and the beginnings of economic growth" (ibid). Agreeing with Kristina Troost and Suzanne Gay, Segal argues that "economic growth was not simply the result of political instability. It also contributed to it" (16), as provincials flexing growing economic muscles disrupted old center/periphery relationships. Thus, "money and trade played key roles in the transformation from a classical society to an early modern one" (22).
Chapter 1: Argument, Sources, Examples Segal reviews the history of coinage in the archipelago, which predates the introduction of writing. It seems that by the 10thC the coinage was in a spiral of debasement brought on by inadequate copper supplies, with the result that Gresham's Law (bad money drives out good) seems to have been given free play, to the point that the economy appears to have been essentially demonetized by the 11thC. Beginning in the 12thC, however, imported Chinese cash came to play a central role in the economy, much to the displeasure of the aristocracy. Segal concludes that the importation of Chinese coins "represented a new trend in the Japan-China trade" and that these coins circulated in defiance of official opposition to them and official attempts to enforce fiduciary rather than actual values (64). Finally, "coins played a key role in the creation of the new medieval economy by facilitating exchange between elites and non-elites outside of the confines of government taxation and the shôen system" (65).
Chapter 2: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at the development of markets; "after the official market system collapsed in the Heian period, urban elites turned to private tribute for the distribution of goods while everyone else relied on merchants, trade, and local markets," which became an important nexus for cash in the countryside (68). Segal concludes that "money and markets became commonplace as much due to the actions of middle-level figures such as estate managers, provincial warriors, and traveling merchants as they did to elites such as bakufu officials and estate proprietors" (ibid).
Chapter 3: Argument, Sources, Examples In this chapter, Segal re-evaluates the tokuseirei decree of 1297, in which the bakufu alienated its retainers' (gokenin) debts, disastrously. Segal argues that "the widespread involvement of gokenin in the evolving, impersonal, market-based economy threatened the bakufu's ability to demand service from its retainers" (110). He concludes that this decree and similar legislation from the period was "a conflation of vice, virtue, and self-interest" (146). Gokenin "vice" led to a bakufu solution that invoked the political idiom of "virtuous" rule but which was motivated by self-interest, namely "the bakufu's interest in perpetuation lord-retainer relations and ensuring that warriors rendered service" (147).
Chapter 4: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at the breakdown of the shôen system in the 14thC, which was part of the transformation of center/periphery relations in this period. Segal charts two major changes to the nengu payment system in this period: one, a shift to commutation, in which rents were paid in cash rather than in kind (often, but not always, at the behest of cultivators rather than proprietors); and two, "the widespread employment of a money remittance system--'bills of exchange'--by merchants and estate managers to forward cash over long distances" (150). Both of these were spurred by the development of regional exchange networks not mediated by the center or elites, which "created demand for estate goods outside of the capital, and thereby made it possible for managers and peasants to sell goods for cash" (166). Ultimately, the uptake of widespread changes in the economy "speaks volumes about how creatively merchants and provincial estate managers could circumvent the problems of divided central government in the 15thC" (183).
Chapter 5: Argument, Sources, Examples After the Kamakura period central elites began to participate more directly in the commercial economy (much to their frequent dismay). The Ashikaga probably took the most active role in attempting to exert their control over the economy, but their efforts were much less than fully successful for several reasons, not least of which because they were politically divided and because they had no guaranteed revenue streams; they could not even monopolize trade with China or the importation of cash effectively. Non-elites continued to play a central role (had) in the development of the late medieval economy. Moreover, medieval money continued to circulate for much of the first Tokugawa century, having laid the groundwork for the increased monetization and commercialization of the Tokugawa economy.
Conclusion: Argument, Sources, Examples Segal concludes by arguing for a late 13thC increase in the spread of money and markets by pointing to the fact that money and markets began to appear in the early to mid 12thC. Monetization "accompanied noteworthy changes in the relationship between center and periphery" and also caused them, as well as "changes in the ways that people thought about the world" (219).
Critical assessment: Ethan Segal is no Wally Scheidel, I have to say. He does not actually know enough about money to say some of the things he is saying--for example, he blithely declares that "even when the government attempted to declare some coins to be worth more than others, people appear to have used coins as if they were of uniform value" (59). Only if you take "uniform value" to mean that "bad money had driven out the good in accordance with Gresham's Law, and general debasement meant that most money was not worth much, despite what the court declared" does this sentence make sense. You could also say something like "the Japanese court attempted to enforce a fiduciary currency but was unable to do so, since people tended to use money at its intrinsic value." He also doesn't appear to understand that taxes and rents are not the same thing.
That having been said, although Segal's analysis is often not very sophisticated, I think his conclusions are fundamentally correct. I also think that there is a better book out there waiting to be written on Japanese currency and monetization than this one.
Further reading: William Wayne Farris, Japan's Medieval Population; Janet Goodwin, Alms and Vagabonds
Meta notes: It might be useful to understand how money works before writing a book about it, IJS.