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ahorbinskiBibliographic Data: Sasaki Gin’ya. “Sengoku Daimyo Rule & Commerce.” Trans. William B. Hauser. In Japan Before Tokugawa, ed. John Whitney Hall et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981: 125-48.
Main Argument: Sasaki argues that "the control of commerce…became an economic and military necessity for the Sengoku gaimyo struggling to establish a firm hold over their domains during the sixteenth century" (125). Sasaki sees Sengoku daimyo policies as having "originality and novelty" compared with those of the shôen proprietors and shugo daimyo, even as Sengoku daimyo were ultimately dependent "for the final solution to they economic problems on the strong central authority that Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and the Tokugawa shoguns alone were to establish" (ibid). Further, domain trade by this point was entangled with Kinai trade (remember the Ômi merchants) and intervillage trade within domains themselves, all of which had evolved together and in competition with each other. Moreover, Sengoku daimyo shared a common problem in that "their effort to assert local political autonomy was often hindered by the absence of a sound economic base," even as, ultimately, the success or failure of the Sengoku daimyo's control over comer and his political control of his domain amounted to one and the same thing" (126, 127).
Argument, Sources, Examples Sengoku daimyo, unlike shugo daimyo, actively encouraged long-distance trade because self-sufficiency in rice and other staple commodities was a central goal of their policy that only active trade could help them meet. To balance trade, daimyo also encouraged exports of domain products to the central markets in the Kinai. "The Sengoku daimyo engaged where possible in the direct protection and control of long-distance trade in order to assure supplies of goods in which their domains were not self-sufficient and to secure the cash necessary to purchase them," showing "their strong desire to change the course and conduct of commerce to an extent that had not been attempted by the political powers that preceded them" (132). Ultimately, however, the security of trade depended upon an authority that did not stop at the boundaries of each individual domain. Although Sengoku daimyo levied some commercial taxes, the varied tax bases of the different domains "suggests that the Sengoku daimyo had not fully grapsed they significance of the growing commercial trade or the great possibilities commercial taxes offered as a source of cash income," coupled with the fact that "most Sengoku daimyo still had not perfected their own system for collecting commercial tax revenues" (137). Although some daimyo attempted to put export controls and prohibitions (nidome) in place, Sasaki concludes that few of them were able to do it effectively. Sengoku daimyo also exercised control over merchants within their domains by allying themselves with powerful merchants, who seem in some places to have been included in the ruling structure outright. At the same time, Sengoku daimyo faced obstacles of varying strength in the remaining tax and toll barrier rights of local proprietors, although over time the daimyo gradually gained more power. Sasaki proposes a three-stage scheme: one, from the Onin War to roughly 1550, when "the pains of developing the domain economies were first experienced" as productive capacities increased and social differentiation of trade and the specialization of handicrafts progressed; two, from 1550 to about 1620, when "the power of the Sengoku daimyo over kokujin and commerce rose perceptibly" (147); and three, from 1620-1660, when the solidification of Tokugawa rule enabled daimyo to exert full authority over merchants and market activities.
Bibliographic Data: Yamamura, Kôzô. “Returns on Unification: Economic Growth in Japan, 1550-1650.” In Japan Before Tokugawa, ed. John Whitney Hall et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981: 327-72.
Main Argument: Yamamura notes that the century from 1550-1650 fundamentally transformed the Japanese economy and society, as an agricultural revolution propelled the growth of commerce and in turn population growth as well improvements in farming technology and management, large-scale irrigation and reclamation works, and fundamental changes to the landholding system--all acting in a mutually beneficial virtuous circle to propel each other, leading the Tokugawa authorities to encourage commerce. Yamamura argues that "agricultural productivity increased principally because an increasing number of peasants, whose rights in land closely approximated that of exclusive private ownership, were able to benefit from their own efforts" (328).
Argument, Sources, Examples Daimyo were freed by the end of the Sengoku era to concentrate on developing their agricultural bases via irrigation and reclamation projects, just as major advances in irrigation and water control made those projects even more effective, with the result that paddy land probably increased by about 50% in this century. It is important to note that daimyo control over the lands they ruled was what induced them to undertake these projects, as well as to accomplish them: they "had an increasingly strong political capacity to mobilize manpower as well as the resources needed to undertake large public works and capture all the direct and indirect gains that resulted" (335). Dissemination of better tools and more productive variety of rice also helped, as did the transfer of de facto control over cultivation to the cultivators themselves, whereas formerly cultivation had been controlled by a group above cultivators (the myôshu). Thus increasing population led to increasing productivity, as increased productivity (which would not benefit peasant cultivators directly) could only be achieved through more intensive cultivation. The creation of cultivation rights was further supported by authorities' desire to prevent the consolidation of independent power bases, meaning that they had an incentive to create small independent peasants. Yamamura argues that the tax burden did not increase radically across the Tokugawa transition (indeed, the rationalization of the tax structure may have decreased the burden, particularly given the increased amount of land under cultivation), partly because of the demand for labor to work the new land under cultivation put the peasants in a strong position, and partly because the rulers recognized the mutual benefit of increased productivity. Yamamura cites various decrees to the effect of recognizing "peasant victories." On the flip side, encouraging commerce also led to rulers' policies designed to create "increased safety, better developed transportation facilities, and improved or new institutional arrangements that both increased market activities and enlarged their range" (359). Most important of these were the abolition of toll gates, the establishment of free markets, and the promotion of the rokusai ichi local markets. For their part, the Tokugawa undertook to improve transportation networks on a national scale, including sea and riverine transport as well as roads. They also standardized weights and measures and the currency, which was reissued regularly for the first time in eight centuries when Hideyoshi struck gold coins beginning in 1595. Yamamura concludes that "two closely interacting forces were the principal causes of this transformation and rapid growth:" political unification and "the creation of a 'new class of peasants' by the rulers of the century of unification" (371).
Critical assessment: These articles are still read because they established the state of the field back when they were first published, and thus they are classic. Indeed, they have established pathways that current scholars are still following.
Main Argument: Sasaki argues that "the control of commerce…became an economic and military necessity for the Sengoku gaimyo struggling to establish a firm hold over their domains during the sixteenth century" (125). Sasaki sees Sengoku daimyo policies as having "originality and novelty" compared with those of the shôen proprietors and shugo daimyo, even as Sengoku daimyo were ultimately dependent "for the final solution to they economic problems on the strong central authority that Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and the Tokugawa shoguns alone were to establish" (ibid). Further, domain trade by this point was entangled with Kinai trade (remember the Ômi merchants) and intervillage trade within domains themselves, all of which had evolved together and in competition with each other. Moreover, Sengoku daimyo shared a common problem in that "their effort to assert local political autonomy was often hindered by the absence of a sound economic base," even as, ultimately, the success or failure of the Sengoku daimyo's control over comer and his political control of his domain amounted to one and the same thing" (126, 127).
Argument, Sources, Examples Sengoku daimyo, unlike shugo daimyo, actively encouraged long-distance trade because self-sufficiency in rice and other staple commodities was a central goal of their policy that only active trade could help them meet. To balance trade, daimyo also encouraged exports of domain products to the central markets in the Kinai. "The Sengoku daimyo engaged where possible in the direct protection and control of long-distance trade in order to assure supplies of goods in which their domains were not self-sufficient and to secure the cash necessary to purchase them," showing "their strong desire to change the course and conduct of commerce to an extent that had not been attempted by the political powers that preceded them" (132). Ultimately, however, the security of trade depended upon an authority that did not stop at the boundaries of each individual domain. Although Sengoku daimyo levied some commercial taxes, the varied tax bases of the different domains "suggests that the Sengoku daimyo had not fully grapsed they significance of the growing commercial trade or the great possibilities commercial taxes offered as a source of cash income," coupled with the fact that "most Sengoku daimyo still had not perfected their own system for collecting commercial tax revenues" (137). Although some daimyo attempted to put export controls and prohibitions (nidome) in place, Sasaki concludes that few of them were able to do it effectively. Sengoku daimyo also exercised control over merchants within their domains by allying themselves with powerful merchants, who seem in some places to have been included in the ruling structure outright. At the same time, Sengoku daimyo faced obstacles of varying strength in the remaining tax and toll barrier rights of local proprietors, although over time the daimyo gradually gained more power. Sasaki proposes a three-stage scheme: one, from the Onin War to roughly 1550, when "the pains of developing the domain economies were first experienced" as productive capacities increased and social differentiation of trade and the specialization of handicrafts progressed; two, from 1550 to about 1620, when "the power of the Sengoku daimyo over kokujin and commerce rose perceptibly" (147); and three, from 1620-1660, when the solidification of Tokugawa rule enabled daimyo to exert full authority over merchants and market activities.
Bibliographic Data: Yamamura, Kôzô. “Returns on Unification: Economic Growth in Japan, 1550-1650.” In Japan Before Tokugawa, ed. John Whitney Hall et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981: 327-72.
Main Argument: Yamamura notes that the century from 1550-1650 fundamentally transformed the Japanese economy and society, as an agricultural revolution propelled the growth of commerce and in turn population growth as well improvements in farming technology and management, large-scale irrigation and reclamation works, and fundamental changes to the landholding system--all acting in a mutually beneficial virtuous circle to propel each other, leading the Tokugawa authorities to encourage commerce. Yamamura argues that "agricultural productivity increased principally because an increasing number of peasants, whose rights in land closely approximated that of exclusive private ownership, were able to benefit from their own efforts" (328).
Argument, Sources, Examples Daimyo were freed by the end of the Sengoku era to concentrate on developing their agricultural bases via irrigation and reclamation projects, just as major advances in irrigation and water control made those projects even more effective, with the result that paddy land probably increased by about 50% in this century. It is important to note that daimyo control over the lands they ruled was what induced them to undertake these projects, as well as to accomplish them: they "had an increasingly strong political capacity to mobilize manpower as well as the resources needed to undertake large public works and capture all the direct and indirect gains that resulted" (335). Dissemination of better tools and more productive variety of rice also helped, as did the transfer of de facto control over cultivation to the cultivators themselves, whereas formerly cultivation had been controlled by a group above cultivators (the myôshu). Thus increasing population led to increasing productivity, as increased productivity (which would not benefit peasant cultivators directly) could only be achieved through more intensive cultivation. The creation of cultivation rights was further supported by authorities' desire to prevent the consolidation of independent power bases, meaning that they had an incentive to create small independent peasants. Yamamura argues that the tax burden did not increase radically across the Tokugawa transition (indeed, the rationalization of the tax structure may have decreased the burden, particularly given the increased amount of land under cultivation), partly because of the demand for labor to work the new land under cultivation put the peasants in a strong position, and partly because the rulers recognized the mutual benefit of increased productivity. Yamamura cites various decrees to the effect of recognizing "peasant victories." On the flip side, encouraging commerce also led to rulers' policies designed to create "increased safety, better developed transportation facilities, and improved or new institutional arrangements that both increased market activities and enlarged their range" (359). Most important of these were the abolition of toll gates, the establishment of free markets, and the promotion of the rokusai ichi local markets. For their part, the Tokugawa undertook to improve transportation networks on a national scale, including sea and riverine transport as well as roads. They also standardized weights and measures and the currency, which was reissued regularly for the first time in eight centuries when Hideyoshi struck gold coins beginning in 1595. Yamamura concludes that "two closely interacting forces were the principal causes of this transformation and rapid growth:" political unification and "the creation of a 'new class of peasants' by the rulers of the century of unification" (371).
Critical assessment: These articles are still read because they established the state of the field back when they were first published, and thus they are classic. Indeed, they have established pathways that current scholars are still following.