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ahorbinskiBibliographic Data: Radchenko, Sergey. Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
Main Argument: What doomed the Sino-Soviet alliance was not ideology but above all Mao Zedong's hostility to the alliance, its inherent inequality, and cultural factors on both sides.
Historiographical Engagement: Extensive declassified documents in Russia and China, as well as archives in secondary Soviet bloc countries including Mongolia, Roumania and Albania; Odd Arne Westad; Lorenz Lüthi.
Introduction: Argument, Sources, Examples The elevation of (great) power concerns over proper Marxist-Leninist praxis and communist fellowship on both sides in the Sino-Soviet split was, unbeknownst to almost everyone at the time, the first crack in the Berlin Wall; in other words, it presaged the eventual end of the Cold War. The alliance fell apart due to its inherent inequality, which the Soviets could not even understand and which the Chinese could not accept.
Chapter 1: Argument, Sources, Examples As a consequence and a function of the ignominious denouement of the Cuban Missle Crisis, about which the Chinese were never consulted or formally informed, tensions in the alliance that had previously been hidden boiled to the surface in the form of criticisms and counter-criticisms conducted in Pravda and The People's Daily, at diplomatic functions and at high-level talks, in Moscow and Beijing, the Zhongnanhai and the Kremlin. Krushchev's impulsive shilly-shallying was directly responsible for Chinese criticisms at Mao's orchestration, which led directly to his seeking detente with the West. (In other words: Both Mao and Krushchev, each of whom fancied himself the arch-revolutionary, betrayed the "revolution.")
Chapter 2: Argument, Sources, Examples In the early phase of the split, Krushchev thought there had been some misunderstanding or was the result of a power struggle in the communist movement; by the end of 1964, however, he had come to believe that the split was cultural in nature, rooted in Chinese "cunning" and untrustworthiness.
Chapter 3: Argument, Sources, Examples After Krushcheve's deposal his successors relied on Marxist-Leninist slogans for guidance in foreign policy, with the result that nothing much changed in Sino-Soviet relations. The Vietnam War, far from reuniting the two ersatz allies, drove them farther apart, while the Soviet "containment" policy, coupled with massive aid to other members of the Soviet bloc, served to reunify most of global communism against China.
Chapter 4: Argument, Sources, Examples After the Cultural Revolution Soviet leaders became convinced that the Cultural Revolution was in fact aimed at the USSR, and that consequently it was incumbent on them to prepare for a war of survival with China. Misperceptions and arrogance on both sides were the result of a long cultural memory of various historical threats, humiliations, and close calls.
Conclusion: Argument, Sources, Examples Mutual military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border led, predictably, to a series of military clashes that stalemated into a decade-long series of talks on border definitions, while only the passage of time and the literal passing of the leadership in both countries eventually allowed China and the USSR to begin to clear the air. In the meantime, both sides' willingness to let power trump ideology presaged and hastened the end of the Cold War and the downfall of communism as a global political force.
Critical assessment: I didn't like this book either, and I didn't have time to finish it. Overall it's in the "here have this pile of facts isn't it cool!" school of historiography, but Radchenko manages to raise a number of interesting questions despite himself and his tendency to make up details about which he cannot possibly have factual evidence (such as what Nikita Krushchev thought about while riding in trains around the USSR), including the question of what did the revolution consist of at this point in time in the communist imaginary--was it an ossified rote repetition of anti-imperialism, or did it still have a pulse? Radchenko also tends to ascribe events to "culture" without defining culture or explaining his ascription, which would irk me even if he didn't follow Samuel Huntingdon in blathering about the "clash of civilizations." I'm with Lydia Liu: civilizations do not clash; empires do. I also can't sanction Radchenko's blithe discounting of ideology in favor of "power;" power is in part a function of the mastery of ideology, just to begin, and to think otherwise, particularly in communism studies (communism being founded on a supposedly scientific ideology), seems willfully naive.
It's fine to want to spice up your recitation of facts with human details or whatever, but the finely sourced anecdotes Radchenko does dredge up, such as the Chinese ambassador's wife drinking Soviet functionaries under the table in a drinking contest at a banquet, or a Soviet official's drunken ranting about China at another banquet, are way more amusing than his wild speculations.
Further reading: Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms; Lorenz Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split.
Meta notes: What is actually meant by "revolution"? and "revolutionary"? Is it possible to be a "revolutionary" without actually having participated in a revolution (I don't think so)? For the communists over time the meaning of "revolutionary" ossified into some sort of vaguely "anti-imperialist" stance, becoming a chimera that could be deployed in internecine political warfare at will. Fascinating, in that vaguely enraging way that all totalitarian politics is. NB: Half of the Gulf of Tonkin incident was fabricated (where are Abraham Lincoln and his spot resolutions when you need them?). Also, Edgar Snow probably ≠ a CIA agent. Also, when your embassy is being besieged as a consequence of X domestic government policy, you may be forgiven for thinking that X is aimed at you---just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you.
Main Argument: What doomed the Sino-Soviet alliance was not ideology but above all Mao Zedong's hostility to the alliance, its inherent inequality, and cultural factors on both sides.
Historiographical Engagement: Extensive declassified documents in Russia and China, as well as archives in secondary Soviet bloc countries including Mongolia, Roumania and Albania; Odd Arne Westad; Lorenz Lüthi.
Introduction: Argument, Sources, Examples The elevation of (great) power concerns over proper Marxist-Leninist praxis and communist fellowship on both sides in the Sino-Soviet split was, unbeknownst to almost everyone at the time, the first crack in the Berlin Wall; in other words, it presaged the eventual end of the Cold War. The alliance fell apart due to its inherent inequality, which the Soviets could not even understand and which the Chinese could not accept.
Chapter 1: Argument, Sources, Examples As a consequence and a function of the ignominious denouement of the Cuban Missle Crisis, about which the Chinese were never consulted or formally informed, tensions in the alliance that had previously been hidden boiled to the surface in the form of criticisms and counter-criticisms conducted in Pravda and The People's Daily, at diplomatic functions and at high-level talks, in Moscow and Beijing, the Zhongnanhai and the Kremlin. Krushchev's impulsive shilly-shallying was directly responsible for Chinese criticisms at Mao's orchestration, which led directly to his seeking detente with the West. (In other words: Both Mao and Krushchev, each of whom fancied himself the arch-revolutionary, betrayed the "revolution.")
Chapter 2: Argument, Sources, Examples In the early phase of the split, Krushchev thought there had been some misunderstanding or was the result of a power struggle in the communist movement; by the end of 1964, however, he had come to believe that the split was cultural in nature, rooted in Chinese "cunning" and untrustworthiness.
Chapter 3: Argument, Sources, Examples After Krushcheve's deposal his successors relied on Marxist-Leninist slogans for guidance in foreign policy, with the result that nothing much changed in Sino-Soviet relations. The Vietnam War, far from reuniting the two ersatz allies, drove them farther apart, while the Soviet "containment" policy, coupled with massive aid to other members of the Soviet bloc, served to reunify most of global communism against China.
Chapter 4: Argument, Sources, Examples After the Cultural Revolution Soviet leaders became convinced that the Cultural Revolution was in fact aimed at the USSR, and that consequently it was incumbent on them to prepare for a war of survival with China. Misperceptions and arrogance on both sides were the result of a long cultural memory of various historical threats, humiliations, and close calls.
Conclusion: Argument, Sources, Examples Mutual military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border led, predictably, to a series of military clashes that stalemated into a decade-long series of talks on border definitions, while only the passage of time and the literal passing of the leadership in both countries eventually allowed China and the USSR to begin to clear the air. In the meantime, both sides' willingness to let power trump ideology presaged and hastened the end of the Cold War and the downfall of communism as a global political force.
Critical assessment: I didn't like this book either, and I didn't have time to finish it. Overall it's in the "here have this pile of facts isn't it cool!" school of historiography, but Radchenko manages to raise a number of interesting questions despite himself and his tendency to make up details about which he cannot possibly have factual evidence (such as what Nikita Krushchev thought about while riding in trains around the USSR), including the question of what did the revolution consist of at this point in time in the communist imaginary--was it an ossified rote repetition of anti-imperialism, or did it still have a pulse? Radchenko also tends to ascribe events to "culture" without defining culture or explaining his ascription, which would irk me even if he didn't follow Samuel Huntingdon in blathering about the "clash of civilizations." I'm with Lydia Liu: civilizations do not clash; empires do. I also can't sanction Radchenko's blithe discounting of ideology in favor of "power;" power is in part a function of the mastery of ideology, just to begin, and to think otherwise, particularly in communism studies (communism being founded on a supposedly scientific ideology), seems willfully naive.
It's fine to want to spice up your recitation of facts with human details or whatever, but the finely sourced anecdotes Radchenko does dredge up, such as the Chinese ambassador's wife drinking Soviet functionaries under the table in a drinking contest at a banquet, or a Soviet official's drunken ranting about China at another banquet, are way more amusing than his wild speculations.
Further reading: Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms; Lorenz Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split.
Meta notes: What is actually meant by "revolution"? and "revolutionary"? Is it possible to be a "revolutionary" without actually having participated in a revolution (I don't think so)? For the communists over time the meaning of "revolutionary" ossified into some sort of vaguely "anti-imperialist" stance, becoming a chimera that could be deployed in internecine political warfare at will. Fascinating, in that vaguely enraging way that all totalitarian politics is. NB: Half of the Gulf of Tonkin incident was fabricated (where are Abraham Lincoln and his spot resolutions when you need them?). Also, Edgar Snow probably ≠ a CIA agent. Also, when your embassy is being besieged as a consequence of X domestic government policy, you may be forgiven for thinking that X is aimed at you---just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you.