ahorbinski: The five elements theory in the style of the periodic table of the elements.  (teach the controversy)
Bibliographic Data: Hostetler, Laura. Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Main Argument:
Simultaneous developments in cartographic and ethnographic modes of representation notable for their emphasis on empirical knowledge derived from direct observation and precise measurement suggest that the Qing was not isolated from global changes during the early modern period, nor was it simply a recipient of European knowledge; it was an active participant in a shared world order. … In short, during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Qing China was more fully a part of what can be called the early modern world than has been generally recognized.(1-2)
Ethnography and mapping were central to these discursive imperial strategies, and early modern states employed both to extend their claims to universal empire. Specifically, "in mapping the territory of the expanding empire, the Qing four purposely chose to use the same idiom, or map language, in which its competitors functioned" and "as with much early modern European ethnography, Qing ethnography was also directed toward use in governance of an expanding empire" (23).

Historiographical Engagement: Joseph Needham, C. D. K. Yee

China's West and Southwest )

Critical assessment: Really this book should have been three articles. Hostetler makes a lot of assertions that she cannot actually prove in the name of making her subject relevant; really she should have spent more time on the early modern.

Further reading: Subrahmanyan, "Connected Histories"; Perdue, China Marches West; Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar; Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation
ahorbinski: The five elements theory in the style of the periodic table of the elements.  (teach the controversy)
Bibliographic Data: Frühstück, Sabine. Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Main Argument: Frühstück is looking at the history of sexuality and sexual knowledge in modern Japan, the revolutions in which she sees as part of a process of colonization. She looks partly at "the obsession with the 'truth about sex' and the use of the phrase as a discursive tool" in contrast to other studies on similar topics, and argues that "as much as negotiations over a modern understanding of sexuality in Japan intersected with concepts of nation and empire building and overlapped with debates about the nature of Japanese culture and the project of modernity, they also functioned to increase the premium placed on scientific-mindedness" (5). Ultimately, this process of colonization produced modern subjects whose sexualities were regulated and disciplined via state power and who thus were proper constituents of the body politic.

Historiographical Engagement: Garon, Molding Japanese Minds

Colonizing sex, somehow )

Critical assessment: This book is fine, but I actually disagree with Tom Laqueur that it is a better book than Pflugfelder's. Frühstück is bad at organizing her chapters and she never actually says what she means by the "colonization of sex." Moreover, unlike Pflugfelder, Frühstück lacks a theory of discourse through which to interpret her conclusions; she has Bourdieu and Foucault, but they are apparently not enough for her to talk about how sex was being constructed explicitly (which is not quite the same complaint as the preceding sentence? or possibly it is). I feel like a European blundering through premodern Cairo--there's no system, no place from which to secure a vantage point and observe.

Further reading: Pflugfelder, Cartographies of Desire; Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt; Masters of Sex
ahorbinski: The five elements theory in the style of the periodic table of the elements.  (teach the controversy)
Bibliographic Data: Mitchell, Timothy. Colonising Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Main Argument:
…the colonial process would try and re-order Egypt to appear as a world enframed. Egypt was to be ordered up as something object-like. In other words it was to be made picture-like and legible, rendered available to political and economic calculation. Colonial power required the country to become readable, like a book, in our own sense of the term.

A framework appears to order things, but also to circumscribe and exclude. As we will see later on, like the perimeter walls that seemed to exclude 'the real world' from the world exhibition, a framework sets up the impression of something beyond the picture-world it enframes. It promises a truth that lies outside its world of material representation. To 'determine the plan' is to build-in an effect of order and an effect of truth. (33)
And thus, Orientalism in the classic sense that Said describes is an artifact of modernity, which developed this bifurcated way of seeing the world and turned it onto the rest of the world, thus creating its own imperception.

Historiographical Engagement: Bourdieu, Foucault

Colonizing Egypt (and the world) )

Critical assessment: This is an excellent book, deservedly a classic.

Further reading: Said, Orientalism; Mitchell, Rule of Experts; Hevia, The Imperial Security State; Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddima; Mario Savio, the machine speech

Meta notes: Remember, listeners, Descartes was wrong, wrong, wrong. Cognition is a side-effect of consciousness, not its main goal--and the liberal subject cannot hold.
ahorbinski: Tomoe Gozen is so badass she glued her OTW mug to her wrist.  (tomoe gozen would haved loved the OTW)
Bibliographic Data: Tonomura, Hitomi. “Black Hair and Red Trousers: Gendering the Flesh in Medieval Japan.” The American Historical Review 99:1 (February 1, 1994): 129–154.

Main Argument: Tonomura is looking at the Konjaku monogatari to provide "analysis of the kinds of social scripts that probably influenced the perceptions of gendered relations, especially in areas of sexual practices and sexuality" (132). In other words, she is reading these tales to detect traces of the process by which patriarchy was instantiated in Japan over the course of several centuries, in effect trying to diagnose where that process was at in the early (12thC) medieval period.

Argument, Sources, Examples Although the KM stories are more even-handed in their treatment of gender relations, gendered bodies, and sexual mores than might be thought, Tonomura notes that "the compiler's comments attached to the narratives frequently reduce women to an essentialized category and set up boundaries within which female sexuality must remain" (133). Marriage is still an amorphous institution, and was not necessarily male-centered; at this time there was also apparently no concept of rape as a crime, not even against a woman's male family members, let alone against the woman herself; when assaults occur, the crime is in how the victim's clothes (symbolic of her social position) are treated. Similarly, there is no concept of adultery, and the impropriety of men "taking" women is directly related to their class; "high-ranking aristocratic men seem incapable of violating women" (152). At the same time, patriarchy is visible in the fact that male characters' faults are theirs alone while the faults of female characters engender pontificating on the flawed nature of women. Even this is not a complete process, however, as Tonomura notes; "in these tales, 'the feminine' is problematized and sometimes negatively coded, but it is not yet established as a consistent, uniform, and stable category" (138). Although there is no discourse of virginity or purity, it is noteworthy that men are desirable in toto while the desirable female body is discussed in parts. Relatedly, Tonomura observes that "a sense of collective male identity is reinforced through the sharing of a common male culture centered on the penis," surely the ancestor of the phallocentric culture of the Edo period (144). Indeed, phallocentrism is already visible in the fact that "the text privileges the male sex organ and makes it the cornerstone of a sexual system for both sexes," meaning that "female desire and pleasure disconnected from men fall outside the range of epistemological possibilities" (148). And while men's bodies share in the collapse of power and vulnerability in the genitalia that female characters also experience, "female bodies are inscribed with clearly chaining values and significance according to their age," and they serve, when decomposing "as a pedagogical symbol, a medium through which to convey the Buddhist messages of impermanence" (144, 145). Similarly, female desires are internally generated while men are lured into desire by women; conveniently enough, desire for women "can be a gateway to greater achievement in the Way of the Buddha" (147). Tonomura concludes that
Women in the Konjaku, however, are burdened with the task of managing both their own sexuality and men's basic instincts, not because women are associated with reason but because they have the power to entice men. Consequently, cultural construction rests heavily on the female's shoulders, complicating the anthropological metanarrative that equates men with culture and women with nature. (154)

Bibliographic Data: Colcutt, Martin. “The Zen Monastery in Kamakura Society.” In Court and Bakufu in Japan: Essays in Kamakura History, ed. Jeffrey P. Mass. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995 [1982]: 191-220.

Main Argument: This paper attempts to elucidate the cause of Zen's meteoric rise in Japan in the Kamakura period "by focusing on the sponsorship of Rinzai Zen, especially the monasteries of Kenchôji and Engakuji" (192). That patronage was mainly from the warrior elite for several reasons relating to their new position vis-a-vis old power holders such as the temple complexes and the imperial court, but it is important to note that their interest was not purely in enlightenment: Zen was attractive partly because it was controllable, and warrior elites did not patronize it exclusively.

Argument, Sources, Examples In terms of the question of who patronized Zen in the Kamakura period, "it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that its growth in Japan was due largely to sponsorship by the elite: the Hôjô and the powerful warriors heading the Kamakura Bakufu, the upper echelons of provincial warrior society, and emperors and members of the Imperial Court," partly because Zen studies demanded a high degree of education (199), especially initially. Why? Zen was socially stable (i.e. its adherents had no complaints against the current political order), and for the Hôjô and the warrior elite, its very newness (i.e. not entwined with older aristocratic power structures) was also favorable. It also offered greater chances for advancement to the scions of those warrior elite than did the established temple complexes. Finally, it was a conduit for the transmission of the culture of the Song literati, the mastery of which could also give warriors cultural cachet equal to the members of the aristocracy. And because the Zen monasteries adopted wholesale the highly developed administrative systems of Chan monasteries in China, they were able to make effective use of the rights within the shôen system that their official patrons procured for them.

Bibliographic Data: Mass, Jeffrey P. “Jitō Land Possession in the Thirteenth Century: The Case of Shitaji Chūbun.” In Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History, edited by John W. Hall and Jeffrey P. Mass. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988 [1974]: 157-83.

Main Argument: "…beginning in the 1180s the country's non-military absentee proprietors ere forced to absorb into their estates management-level warrior-officers over whom they had no direct control. It was this immunity of the jitô as a vassal of Kamakura that set the stage for the thirteenth century's endemic central-local struggles over land" (157).

Argument, Sources, Examples There were two types of jitô: "those who were longtime residents in their appointment areas, and those who were newly intruded from the outside" (157). Many "confirmatory" jitô were local myôshu who had been invested as "shôen officers" (shôshi); at the same time, most of the great warrior families of the East held their lands outside the shôen system of immunities and so were willing to participate in the bakufu's new system of stewardship, which did confer immunity. In the West, however, things were different; "the basic clash of interests that highlights the 13thC thus became one between Kantô-born jitô and central proprietors of western province estates" (160), often in the form of their personally appointed azukari dokoro, a kind of local deputy. This led to a situation in which "the traditional hierarchy of more or less vertical tenures had now flattened out and divided into two roughly parallel tracks of authority" (163). By the middle of the 13thC, the Kyoto proprietors were on the defensive, evolving such practices as wayo (compromise) and ukesho (receipt guarantees) to try to stanch the bleeding, with the ultimate effect that central powers of proprietorship began to devolve back to the land. Shitaji chûbun, estate division, was a last-ditch strategy to fend off jitô predations. When divisions did occur, moreover, they often did so synthetically rather than naturally, as the shôen as a unit was resistant to such easy territorial breakup. By the end of the 14thC, shugo had totally displaced proprietors and jitô as the final authority at the provincial level, rendering shitaji chûbun obsolete. Sources: Documents. All the documents.

Bibliographic Data: Shapinsky, Peter D. “With the Sea as Their Domain: Pirates and Maritime Lordship in Medieval Japan.” In Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges, ed.y Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003: 221-38.

Main Argument: Shapinsky argues that the "sea lords" of the 15th and 16thC "became integral elements of the 16thC Japanese political and economic order and came to play a vital role in the functioning of the maritime networks of violence and exchange that connected Japan to the wider East Asian maritime world" (224). These sea lords did so by exercising "sea tenure," namely "control over access to the sea and the tools of maritime production such as ships, salterns, and fishing gear" (223). However, they did so in competition with traditional land-based authorities, with the result that "modes of sea tenure thus included both the regulations of state-level entities and the customary practices of local littoral inhabitants" (ibid).

Argument, Sources, Examples Shapinsky argues that the "terracentric" biases of historians and sources have heretofore masked the activity of sea lord-bands in lord-vassal binaries, but that a better rubric is patron-client relationships, which "allows the historian to represent both the autonomy and agency of the sea-lord bands and the land-based patrons' expectations for loyal service" (226). Sea lords thus appropriated and manipulated land-based discourse to gain recognition of their status as equal to that of warrior elites. It is important to recognize that the activities of sea lords were enabled by the disintegration of traditional political authority in the archipelago at the same time as a medieval commercial revolution occurred, rendering the sea a vastly faster and more reliable means of transporting goods and conducting commerce. Sea lords took advantage of this fact to profitably exercise sea tenure: among other activities, they set up fortified toll barriers at various maritime chokepoints and charged tolls to pass; they charged for escort by members of bands or by ships; they charged for safe passage; and in the final half of the 16thC, they sold safe passage flags outright, as their authority at sea eclipsed even that of the unifiers. These practices were productive for commerce as well as predatory. After 1600, however, the new national government brought them to heel, and their day passed.

Bibliographic Data: Nagahara Keiji. “Landownership under the Shōen-Kokugaryō System.” Journal of Japanese Studies 1:2 (April 1, 1975): 269–96.

Main Argument: The shôen-kokugaryô system began to emerge from the ritsuryô system in the 11thC as a multi-layered system of ownership over land. By the C13, difficulties in maintaining cadastral surveys meant that more and more "public" paddies fell into private hands, becoming the basis for peasant landownership. "The multi-layered shiki formed the basis of positions and of rights for both the higher level proprietary lords and the lower level proprietary lords in shôen and in kokugaryô" (287). Under this system, higher level proprietary lords received the lion's share of the profits. Shiki, however, were distributed geographically and did not confer the power to command persons, indicating their limited development. Under this system, however, peasants held cultivation rather than landowning rights, reflecting their underdevelopment, mirroring that of local lords; thus, the shiki were supported by the authority of the central government during this period. The system foundered because local proprietary lords grew in power, because peasant landholding rights strengthened, and the shiki system disintegrated.
ahorbinski: a bridge in the fog (bridge to anywhere)
Bibliographic Data: Eckstein, Arthur M. Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

Main Argument: "International politics in the ancient Mediterranean world was long a multipolar anarchy–a world containing a plurality of powerful states, contending with each other for hegemony, within a situation where international law was minimal and in any case unenforceable" (1). The Republic of Rome, however, did establish a system of unipolarity in the Mediterranean by the 160s BCE at the latest, a unipolar system with Rome as the hegemony that lasted for six hundred years. Rome did not establish this hegemony because it was exceptionally bellicose; indeed, it was no more or less warlike than its state-level competitors and what gave it its comparative advantage was its ability to leverage its allies through the flexible management of Roman identity (i.e. the citizenship and various other statuses), eventually being able to field far larger armies and command much greater resources than its competitors. But it is a fatal mistake to ignore the effect of its interstate environment on Rome's development, and on the exact character of the Romans' achievement; "the stress here is–and given the condition of scholarly analysis it must be–on acknowledging the previously unacknowledged role of system-level factors, both in the causation of warfare in the ancient Mediterranean and in the rise of Rome to world power" (35).

Historiographical Engagement: Mommsen, because everything old is new again and nothing ever dies; lots of "realists" throughout history--Thucydides, Hobbes, Arendt, Kissinger, Zakaria

The war of all against all, and how the East was won )

Critical assessment: This is an excellent book, although it's rather trippy to be reading something in 2006 going on about how Mommsen was right and unironically citing Henry Kissinger. And if we are led in the end back to unit-level factors by this thorough examination of the anarchic interstate system in which Rome existed and over which it ultimately triumphed, it is very nice to know that we can weight those factors and select them correctly, having carried out the exercise.

Further reading: Hobbes, Leviathan; Kant, Perpetual Peace; Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome; Mattern, Rome and the Enemy

Meta notes: Rome is a black swan. Mommsen was right. Ditto Thucydides. And Polybius was right too, don't forget about him.

"We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time."
ahorbinski: an imperial stormtrooper with the word "justic3" (imperial justice)
Bibliographic Data: Hevia, James L. The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Main Argument: Hevia states at the beginning that "the Indian Army Intelligence Branch, and the forms of knowledge it produced, is the focus of this study. The records of the Branch, its library, archives and correspondence, make quite clear the scope and depth of the epistemological project at the core of British imperialism" (2). Hevia argues "that military intelligence was a product of the new mechanisms of state formation, the disciplinary and regulatory regimes, to use Michel Foucault's terms, that transformed European states in the second half of the nineteenth century into militarized polities" (5). Hevia argues that studying the imperial intelligence apparatus leads one to appreciate "the role of the military in initiation, influencing, and implementing policy" (16). Also, "military intelligence not only framed imperial strategies vis-a-vis colonized areas to the east, but produced the very object of intervention: Asia itself" (ibid).

Imperial security )

Critical assessment: James Hevia's English Lessons is easily one of the best books I've read in graduate school, and I'm not surprised to be saying that this is another excellent study, although somewhat more restricted in scope. But the final chapter in particular brings it all home brilliantly--how empire perpetuates itself after its death, how colonial processes are turned on the metropole and vice versa, how no knowledge is ever neutral or apolitical and how history has real consequences. Brilliant.

Further reading: Hevia, English Lessons; Kipling, Kim; Mitchell, Rule of Experts; Charles Callwell, Small Wars

Meta notes: In the current phase of this story, we should all be very clear that we in the metropole are not the British Army intelligence officers, but rather the Chinese--and the subjects of these regimes in Asia and elsewhere are still subject to them, in an evolved form.
ahorbinski: The five elements theory in the style of the periodic table of the elements.  (teach the controversy)
Bibliographic Data: Guha, Ranajit. Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Main Argument: Guha argues that "insurgency…was the necessary antithesis of colonialism during the entire phase between its incipience and coming of age in India" (2). The British attempt to understand and deal with peasant insurgency required a written record that was a discourse of power, that attempted to understand violence in light of past experience. This colonial record was thus "rational in its representation of the past as linear and secular rather than cyclical and mythic" (3). This official historiography has been read as-is, rather than in reverse as it must be in order to recover the character of peasant insurgency and agency, and thus peasant consciousness.

Historiographical Engagement: Gramsci, Marx, Hobsbawm, Engels, Mao, Hegel, Durkheim, Saussure, Bakhtin. Sidebar: Guha is taking on at least five separate schools of historiography (British imperialist historiography out of Oxford; comprador collaborationist thesis out of Cambridge Marxist school which holds that colonialism is an effect of capitalism; Indian nationalist historiography; Indian Marxist historiography; and European Marxist historiography)

Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency )

Critical assessment: This book is considered a classic, and it's not hard to see why; Guha masterfully flips the historical record the right way round (as Alexander Herzen might say in The Coast of Utopia) and reads an entirely new story there. The one remark I have is that as a fairly hardcore Marxist, Guha's writing is sometimes a bit terminology laden, but this is a minor quibble. For Guha, the project of Indian nationalism and nationalist historiography was a failure (because neither took account of the peasantry, i.e. 75% of the Indian population) and this is thus a counter-nationalist historiography, because the nation dominates the story. There's also the question of caste, which is discussed here though not necessarily very explicitly.

Further reading: James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak; Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe; Guha, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency"; Joan Wallach Scott, "On Language, Gender, and Working-Class History"

Meta notes: "You’ve got Hegel’s Dialectical Spirit of History upside down and so has he. People don’t storm the Bastille because history proceeds by zigzags. History zigzags because when people have had enough, they storm the Bastille."
ahorbinski: A picture of Charles Darwin captioned "very gradual change" in the style of the Obama 'Hope' poster.  (Darwin is still the man.)
Bibliographic Data: Fan, Fa-Ti. British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Main Argument: This book "attempts to explain how Western (especially British) naturalists in China and their Chinese 'associates' explored, studied, and represented China's natural world in both local and global contexts" (2), employing the concept of "contact zone" or "borderlands" to "denote the intersecting zone between the temporal and spatial trajectories of peoples of different geographic origins, cultures, and histories" (3).

Historiographical Engagement:  Empire theorists and historians, naturalists, historians of science

British naturalists in Qing China )

Critical assessment: I wish this book were longer and went into more detail, and that some of my favorite books on the same general topic, such as Hevia's English Lessons, had been around for him to reference and dialogue with when he was writing. That said, it's excellent, both for the dimensions it illuminates and for his insistence that reading the process of empire as entirely one-sided is incorrect.

Further reading: Marie Brennan, A Natural History of Dragons; James Hevia, The Imperial Security State

Meta notes: No man is an empire, entire of itself.
ahorbinski: A DJ geisha (historical time is a construct)
Bibliographic Data: Ambaras, David Richard. Bad Youth: Juvenile Delinquency and the Politics of Everyday Life in Modern Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

Main Argument:
If delinquency symbolized the dangers of uncontrolled social change and the defects of existing social arrangements, champions of juvenile reform and juvenile protection envisioned an orderly, productive Japan that could master the challenges of the modern era, from industrialization to imperialist expansion to total war. The ideas of these reformers, and the thick, intrusive network of socialization agencies that they constructed, have to this day played a critical role in shaping Japanese experiences of home, school, work, and play, and in fostering the culture of discipline and social vigilance for which contemporary Japan is internationally known. (2)

Historiographical Engagement: Lots of sociologists and Japanese historians

The kids are(n't) all right )

Critical assessment: This is a well-written, thoughtful study that does what it says on the tin and illuminates one of the most pervasive aspects of modern Japanese society very effectively along the way. I am also very grateful for Ambaras' attempts to recover the politics of everyday life and the reactions of those subjects of these regimes to their workings, even if the evidence is sparse in some respects and he cannot offer a fully polyvocal history.

Further reading: Silverberg, Erotic Grotesque Nonsense; Kingsberg, Moral Nation; Jones, Developmental Fairy Tales; Pflugfelder, Cartographies of Desire
ahorbinski: The five elements theory in the style of the periodic table of the elements.  (teach the controversy)
Bibliographic Data: Mullaney, Thomas S. Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

Main Argument:
These differences in ethnotaxonomy [from the Qing to the Republic to the PRC] cannot be accounted for at the level of the categorized. Rather, what changed over the course of this period were the ethnopolitical worldviews of the different Chinese regimes, the modes and methods of categorization they employed, and the political commitments that guided their respective efforts to reconceptualize China in the postimperial era. There was no single “search for a nation in modern Chinese nationalism”—rather, there were searches, in the plural. (3)
Historiographical Engagement: James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State; others

Finding the minzu in modern China )

Critical assessment: Mullaney is a really smart dude, and therefore it's doubly frustrating that this book is so short. I am reliably informed that he knows a lot more about this topic than he actually says in the book, and even aside from that, he gestures towards some really interesting ideas in his introduction that are never picked up again in the book--indeed, he never pursues most of the interesting implications of his ideas. So, I think he is substantially correct as far as he goes, but this is a short book, and if I were an editor, I would have asked him for the missing 1/3 of the manuscript before I published it.

Further reading: Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise; Scott, Seeing Like a State; Fan, British Naturalists in Qing China

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ahorbinski: shelves stuffed with books (Default)
Andrea J. Horbinski

August 2017

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