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ahorbinski) wrote2014-03-09 02:41 pm
ahorbinski) wrote2014-03-09 02:41 pm
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Book review: Peasant Protests and Uprisings in Tokugawa Japan
Bibliographic Data: Vlastos, Stephen. Peasant Protests and Uprisings in Tokugawa Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
Main Argument: In early modern Japan peasant protest was ubiquitous, which is less attributable to the oppressiveness of the Tokugawa order than to the fact that "the internal organization of the peasant class and its position within the Tokugawa polity were highly conducive to collective action," particular the Tokugawa status system and the fact that villages were independent administrative units which were collectively responsible for tax payments (11). Vlastos is, by his own admission, "less interested in what set of conditions 'caused' peasants to protest than in the nature, form, and content of the movements" and in "the structure of conflict and what it can tell us about class relations," since he assumes (correctly) that conflict between lord and peasant was the central tension of the system (5).
Historiographical Engagement: Lots of sociologists and historians of early modern Japan
Chapter 1: Argument, Sources, Examples Vlastos is interested in social conflict, but he does not see it as a failure, but rather as a natural part of the system, in keeping with his Marxist viewpoint and in criticism of people like Durkheim and Parsons [vomit]. Vlastos' argument is that "violent collective actions tell us something about the organized expression of social conflict, but not everything we need to know"--a point of especial salience in Tokugawa Japan, in which protests were mostly un-violent but also often successful (3). Particularly in the early Tokugawa period, peasants relied on the norm of "benevolent rule" to mobilize collective action in order to uphold the "right to continue as farmers," as the ability of all holders in the village to do this was of consequence to everyone. Tokugawa peasant disturbances tended to be nonviolent partly because of the samurai monopoly on violence and partly because disturbances were generally tolerated at some level whereas rebellion was not. But by the later Tokugawa period, "mass demonstrations accompanied by considerable destruction of property typified collective action," as part of the increasing marketization of the economy (20).
Chapter 2: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter explores the "political economy of benevolence" using the example of the fief of Aizu illustrates the dictum that seeking to profit lords at the expense of peasants was self-defeating in the long run; thus "the confiscatory nature of the kokudaka system made benevolence a necessary function of fief administration" (41).
Chapter 3: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at collective action in the first half of the Tokugawa era. Peasants employed the right of petition, but direct-appeal movements came to dominate collective action, which generally relied on suasion (via the rhetoric of the ideal of benevolence) to pressure lords, since it was a norm they used to justify their own position. Demonstrations (and forceful ones) gradually became more prominent in the 18thC, although the ideology of protest had not changed; the really significant change was "the dramatic entry of non-elite peasants as the principal actors in rural conflict," unlike the high-status men who had led direct appeal efforts (66). These protests had new aspects which involved "representation, mobilization, and tactics" as a consequence of "the fiscal needs of the seigneurial class, and changes in social relations at the village level" (70). Receiving petitions was costly, making lords less likely to do it, necessitating that peasants develop other tactics; the other factor was "the breaking down of the traditional relationship within the village between hierarchy and political representation," meaning that headmen were no longer likely to lead peasant collective action as part of the increasing independence of small proprietors (71).
Chapter 4: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at new causes of conflict in the latter half of the Tokugawa period. Essentially, "peasants became more disputatious as participation in the market increased" (75). One would hypothesize that this was partly because marketization delinked peasants from purely local concerns as they were sutured into regional and national networks, putting them into greater conflict with lords whose revenue concerns were fundamentally local. Only partly, because--especially in the 19thC--protests were increasingly likely to be directed against rich peasants, who "took on economic roles as moneylenders, landlords, and merchants which generated social conflict" (91).
Chapter 5: Argument, Sources, Examples "This chapter analyzes sericulture production in the Shindatsu district of Fukushima where, in 1866, tens of thousands of peasants rioted for six days," the most destructive peasant movement of the entire Tokugawa period (92). This chapter is actually a long discussion of sericulture and its socioeconomic effects: "because of the efficiency of family-centered silk production and the low capital requirements, poor peasants became silk producers, and the benefits and risks associated with being producers were distributed broadly" (112). While some smallholders essentially became a rural proletariat, many were able to continue living on their land due to silkworm income, masking "the extent to which the market and the development of commodity production had created new conflict relations" (113).
Chapter 6: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter examines the events and causes of the Shindatsu uprising, one of which was the so-called "price-scissors effect," in which "the poorest suffered the greatest reduction in purchasing power relative to essential needs" (136). Equally critical was the failure of the moral economy, or rather, "the repeated failure of village officials to protect the interests of the poor" (140). Whereas wealthy peasants were acting in the new market-based moral idiom, smaller peasants sought to (re)impose the older Tokugawa moral idiom of collective action and benevolence.
Chapter 7: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at the so-called yonaoshi uprisings in Aizu in 1868, in which peasants went on a campaign to overthrow the moral and social hierarchy after the fall of Aizu-Wakamtasu to the Meiji forces, albeit in a local rather than national idiom; "the political struggle for control of village office reflected the sharp division between the old wealthy farm families and moneylenders and the majority of small proprietors" and also reflected a basic conflict over the legitimate basis of local authority: popular consent or history and benevolence (150-51)? For the last, "the peasants who sacked village officials and convened popular assemblies" appealed to the Meiji government (153).
Chapter 8: Argument, Sources, Examples Vlastos, more or less openly Marxist, argues with James C. Scott's "moral economy" theory of peasant resistance since, in his view the concept of "subsistence" as "an acceptable minimum standard of living" is too broad, and also "it is by no means clear that peasants prefer subsistence-type economic relationships, or that 'traditional' economic arrangements offer greater security" (156). That said, the Aizu yonaoshi rebellion was an exception in that "most yonaoshi uprisings did not lead to collective action beyond moral economy" (164). Because of the limited political consciousness of peasants or something, there was no "social revolution" at the time of the Meiji Restoration.
Critical assessment: NB: Vlastos is heavily influenced by the earlier generations' assumptions about "Tokugawa stability," reports of which to my mind have been somewhat exaggerated. I think this book is too short, but the structure is also too long? It does not need eight chapters, and frankly, a lot of these points were covered more perceptively by Mark Ravina 10 years later. (See Further Reading, below.)
Further reading: Ravina, Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan; Wigen, The Making of a Japanese Periphery
Meta notes: The weapons of the weak are weapons all the same.
Main Argument: In early modern Japan peasant protest was ubiquitous, which is less attributable to the oppressiveness of the Tokugawa order than to the fact that "the internal organization of the peasant class and its position within the Tokugawa polity were highly conducive to collective action," particular the Tokugawa status system and the fact that villages were independent administrative units which were collectively responsible for tax payments (11). Vlastos is, by his own admission, "less interested in what set of conditions 'caused' peasants to protest than in the nature, form, and content of the movements" and in "the structure of conflict and what it can tell us about class relations," since he assumes (correctly) that conflict between lord and peasant was the central tension of the system (5).
Historiographical Engagement: Lots of sociologists and historians of early modern Japan
Chapter 1: Argument, Sources, Examples Vlastos is interested in social conflict, but he does not see it as a failure, but rather as a natural part of the system, in keeping with his Marxist viewpoint and in criticism of people like Durkheim and Parsons [vomit]. Vlastos' argument is that "violent collective actions tell us something about the organized expression of social conflict, but not everything we need to know"--a point of especial salience in Tokugawa Japan, in which protests were mostly un-violent but also often successful (3). Particularly in the early Tokugawa period, peasants relied on the norm of "benevolent rule" to mobilize collective action in order to uphold the "right to continue as farmers," as the ability of all holders in the village to do this was of consequence to everyone. Tokugawa peasant disturbances tended to be nonviolent partly because of the samurai monopoly on violence and partly because disturbances were generally tolerated at some level whereas rebellion was not. But by the later Tokugawa period, "mass demonstrations accompanied by considerable destruction of property typified collective action," as part of the increasing marketization of the economy (20).
Chapter 2: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter explores the "political economy of benevolence" using the example of the fief of Aizu illustrates the dictum that seeking to profit lords at the expense of peasants was self-defeating in the long run; thus "the confiscatory nature of the kokudaka system made benevolence a necessary function of fief administration" (41).
Chapter 3: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at collective action in the first half of the Tokugawa era. Peasants employed the right of petition, but direct-appeal movements came to dominate collective action, which generally relied on suasion (via the rhetoric of the ideal of benevolence) to pressure lords, since it was a norm they used to justify their own position. Demonstrations (and forceful ones) gradually became more prominent in the 18thC, although the ideology of protest had not changed; the really significant change was "the dramatic entry of non-elite peasants as the principal actors in rural conflict," unlike the high-status men who had led direct appeal efforts (66). These protests had new aspects which involved "representation, mobilization, and tactics" as a consequence of "the fiscal needs of the seigneurial class, and changes in social relations at the village level" (70). Receiving petitions was costly, making lords less likely to do it, necessitating that peasants develop other tactics; the other factor was "the breaking down of the traditional relationship within the village between hierarchy and political representation," meaning that headmen were no longer likely to lead peasant collective action as part of the increasing independence of small proprietors (71).
Chapter 4: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at new causes of conflict in the latter half of the Tokugawa period. Essentially, "peasants became more disputatious as participation in the market increased" (75). One would hypothesize that this was partly because marketization delinked peasants from purely local concerns as they were sutured into regional and national networks, putting them into greater conflict with lords whose revenue concerns were fundamentally local. Only partly, because--especially in the 19thC--protests were increasingly likely to be directed against rich peasants, who "took on economic roles as moneylenders, landlords, and merchants which generated social conflict" (91).
Chapter 5: Argument, Sources, Examples "This chapter analyzes sericulture production in the Shindatsu district of Fukushima where, in 1866, tens of thousands of peasants rioted for six days," the most destructive peasant movement of the entire Tokugawa period (92). This chapter is actually a long discussion of sericulture and its socioeconomic effects: "because of the efficiency of family-centered silk production and the low capital requirements, poor peasants became silk producers, and the benefits and risks associated with being producers were distributed broadly" (112). While some smallholders essentially became a rural proletariat, many were able to continue living on their land due to silkworm income, masking "the extent to which the market and the development of commodity production had created new conflict relations" (113).
Chapter 6: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter examines the events and causes of the Shindatsu uprising, one of which was the so-called "price-scissors effect," in which "the poorest suffered the greatest reduction in purchasing power relative to essential needs" (136). Equally critical was the failure of the moral economy, or rather, "the repeated failure of village officials to protect the interests of the poor" (140). Whereas wealthy peasants were acting in the new market-based moral idiom, smaller peasants sought to (re)impose the older Tokugawa moral idiom of collective action and benevolence.
Chapter 7: Argument, Sources, Examples This chapter looks at the so-called yonaoshi uprisings in Aizu in 1868, in which peasants went on a campaign to overthrow the moral and social hierarchy after the fall of Aizu-Wakamtasu to the Meiji forces, albeit in a local rather than national idiom; "the political struggle for control of village office reflected the sharp division between the old wealthy farm families and moneylenders and the majority of small proprietors" and also reflected a basic conflict over the legitimate basis of local authority: popular consent or history and benevolence (150-51)? For the last, "the peasants who sacked village officials and convened popular assemblies" appealed to the Meiji government (153).
Chapter 8: Argument, Sources, Examples Vlastos, more or less openly Marxist, argues with James C. Scott's "moral economy" theory of peasant resistance since, in his view the concept of "subsistence" as "an acceptable minimum standard of living" is too broad, and also "it is by no means clear that peasants prefer subsistence-type economic relationships, or that 'traditional' economic arrangements offer greater security" (156). That said, the Aizu yonaoshi rebellion was an exception in that "most yonaoshi uprisings did not lead to collective action beyond moral economy" (164). Because of the limited political consciousness of peasants or something, there was no "social revolution" at the time of the Meiji Restoration.
Critical assessment: NB: Vlastos is heavily influenced by the earlier generations' assumptions about "Tokugawa stability," reports of which to my mind have been somewhat exaggerated. I think this book is too short, but the structure is also too long? It does not need eight chapters, and frankly, a lot of these points were covered more perceptively by Mark Ravina 10 years later. (See Further Reading, below.)
Further reading: Ravina, Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan; Wigen, The Making of a Japanese Periphery
Meta notes: The weapons of the weak are weapons all the same.